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Docket No. 870168-CA 
-000O000-
PARTIES 
The only parties to this action are those named in the caption, 
although Plaintiff-Respondent Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company transacts business as "Mountain Bell." 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(C), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Circuit Court in 
a civil action to recover for damages to a telephone cable. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in receiving, as the only evidence of 
Plaintiff's damages and without proper foundation, a computer-generated 
document reflecting computer calculations? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant Baker's motion to 
dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's case inasmuch as Plaintiff had presented 
no evidence of negligence and no admissible evidence of its damages? 
3. Are the trial court's Findings of negligence on the part of 
Appellant supported by any substantial credible evidence or are they clearly 
erroneous? 
4. Are the trial court's Findings as to Appellant's damages 
supported by any credible evidence or are they clearly erroneous? 
5. Is the trial court's Finding of no negligence on the part of 
Defendant-Respondent Hansen supported by any credible evidence or is it 
clearly erroneous? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Sections 54-8a-4, 54-8a-6, and 54-8a-8, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), are relevant to this action. The computer-generated 
exhibit, in light of the foundation offered for it, was inadmissible pursuant 
to Rules 804 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. These statutes and 
rules are reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-2 - A-6. 
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
This action was filed by Plaintiff-Respondent on January 6, 1987. 
(R. at 1.) Defendant Baker filed a pro se answer on his own behalf on 
February 2, 1987. (R. at 11.) Defendant-Appellant Baker was subsequently 
granted leave by the trial court to file a formal Answer and Crossclaim on 
March 18, 1987. (R. at 57.) Defendant-Respondent Hansen filed an Answer 
to the Crossclaim on March 30, 1987. (R. at 46.) 
The matter proceeded to trial before the Circuit Court, sitting 
without a jury, on the afternoon of April 3, 1987. The Circuit Court ruled 
against Defendant-Appellant Baker on all issues (R. at 176-177), and signed 
without alteration Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgments 
submitted by counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant-Respondent Hansen. 
(R. at 60 and 66, 61 and 66, and 61 and 67.) This appeal followed. 
(R. at 69.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant George Baker is a licensed contractor. On 
Friday, November 16, 1984, Mr. Baker's company was contacted by 
Defendant-Respondent Hansen and informed that Mr. Hansen's sewer line 
was backed up and that raw sewage was overflowing in his basement and 
running down his gravel driveway. (R. at 150.) Mr. Hansen informed 
Mr. Baker's company that the situation was an emergency and that he 
wanted a backhoe and an operator immediately. (R. at 150.) The Hansen 
household consisted of four members and it would have been an 
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impossibility for them to live in their house Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and 
into the following week without being able to run water down the drains or 
flush any of the toilets. (R. at 158.) Mr. Hansen considered the matter 
one of great urgency and stayed home from work in order to resolve the 
problem. (R. at 158.) Mr. Baker's company offered to send a full crew and 
contact the "Blue Stakes" program (R. at 117); however, Mr. Hansen insisted 
that he knew where all the utilities were on his property (R. at 117) and 
rejected a "full crew," noting that he would do the hand digging 
(R. at 150). 
When Roger Duvall, the backhoe operator dispatched to 
Mr. Hansen's residence, arrived, he noted that Mr. Hansen had already 
excavated and exposed a break in the sewer pipe in the Hansen driveway. 
(R. at 132.) Mr. Duvall checked the pipe by inserting a garden hose and 
determined that there was an additional stoppage further down the line. 
(R. at 133.) Mr. Hansen and Mr. Duvall walked down the sewer line and 
found another location where raw sewage was bubbling up through the 
ground. (R. at 133.) Mr. Hansen requested Mr. Duvall to go ahead and 
excavate in the vicinity of this second location, agreeing that he would use 
the hand shovel himself. (R. at 135.) Mr. Duvall explained to Mr. Hansen 
that he would be digging in front of the backhoe in order to locate the 
sewer pipe or any buried utilities and that Mr. Duvall would then scoop dirt 
from the trench with the backhoe to the depth of the shovel blade, and 
that the process would be repeated. (R. at 135.) 
4 
In this process, Mr. Duvall discovered, before damaging it, a dark 
cylindrical object. (R. at 138.) Mr. Duvall asked Mr. Hansen what the 
object was and Mr. Hansen inspected it and reported that it was a "tree 
root." (R. at 138.) At trial, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he had told 
Mr. Duvall that the object was a tree root. (R. at 153.) Mr. Duvall again 
questioned Mr. Hansen as to what the object was and Mr. Hansen responded 
that it was a tree root and to "tear it out.H (R. at 138.) Mr. Duvall 
proceeded to dislodge the object, became suspicious when he encountered 
more resistance than would be expected from a tree root, again stopped the 
backhoe to inspect the object, and determined that it was a telephone 
cable. (R. at 139.) 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company was called and 
repaired the cable. Both Mr. Hansen and Mr. Baker refused to pay 
Mountain States' claim for the damage to the cable. 
At trial, Mountain States called two witnesses: an administrative 
reports clerk and the supervisor of the repair. Neither witness offered any 
testimony of any negligence on the part of the backhoe operator. The only 
evidence as to its damages offered by Mountain States, over the objection 
of Mr. Baker, was a computer-generated document. The administrative 
reports clerk testified that she had typed in the number of hours reported 
by the repair supervisor and that the computer had generated a "bill" for 
the repairs. She admitted that she had no idea as to the actual supplies 
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used, the cost of the tools or supplies used, or the formulas or calculations 
used by the computer in generating the "bill." 
The trial court overruled Defendant Baker's objection to the 
computer-generated "bill," denied his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case even though Plaintiff had presented no evidence of any 
negligence, and entered a judgment of no cause of action on his cross-claim 
against Defendant-Respondent Hansen. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only evidence submitted by the Respondent utility in support 
of its claim was a computer-generated "bill" prepared by its "claims office." 
That document consists almost entirely of amounts calculated, as opposed to 
retrieved, by computer. As such, it is hearsay. The foundation laid for the 
document was not sufficient to render it admissible under the business 
records exception. A Plaintiff in a tort case may not prove its unliquidated 
damages through the admission of computer-generated calculations, 
particularly where, such as in the present case, the foundation witness is 
unable to provide any explanation as to the formulas, calculations, or 
methods employed by the computer in generating the document. 
While a utility whose facilities have been damaged through 
negligence is entitled to recover the reasonable and ordinary cost of 
repairing those facilities, it is not entitled to prove its damages based upon 
average costs or accounting estimates. Moreover, it is entitled to recover 
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only those indirect overhead expenses proximately related to the defendant's 
conduct. 
Appellant Baker's motion to dismiss should have been granted 
because the Respondent utility failed to offer any evidence of any 
negligence on the part of Appellant's backhoe operator and because the 
unrefuted evidence at trial demonstrated that an emergency circumstance 
existed because raw sewage was flooding Respondent Hansen's basement and 
bubbling up through the ground. Utah law does not require that a utility 
be notified before excavation is commenced if an emergency exists. Utah 
law imposes a prima facie presumption of evidence only if an excavation is 
made without the required notice being given. In this case, notice was not 
required because an emergency existed and, moreover, any presumption of 
negligence was rebutted by the unrefuted evidence of the care and caution 
with which Appellant Baker's employee operated the backhoe. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing Appellant Baker's 
crossclaim against Respondent Hansen. It was Respondent Hansen who 
insisted that the Blue Stakes program not be contacted and who stated that 
he knew where all the utilities on his property were located. It was 
Respondent Hansen who declined Appellant Baker's offer to provide a full 
crew, agreeing that he would, instead, do the manual shoveling and act as 
"spotter" himself. Moreover, Appellant Baker's backhoe operator located the 
communications cable and asked Respondent Hansen what it was before it 
was damaged. Respondent Hansen examined the object, reported that it was 
7 
a tree root, and instructed Defendant Baker's employee to "tear it out." 
Only then was the cable damaged. Under these circumstances, the trial 
court erred in dismissing the crossclaim of Appellant Baker against 
Respondent Hansen. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, THE COMPUTER CALCULATED "BILL" WAS INADMISSIBLE AND 
THERE WAS NO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES. 
The only evidence of the damages claimed by Plaintiff in this 
action is found in a computer-generated "bill" received over Defendant's 
objection (R. at 94-95) as Exhibit P-l (reproduced infra at A-26). Such 
foundation as was laid for this exhibit was provided by Plaintiff's witness, 
Ann Nielsen. She testified that she was "an administrative reports clerk" 
for Plaintiff's "area claims office" and that her work consisted of dealing 
with damage claims, investigating the claims, "billing the claims," and 
following up on the claims if payment was not received. (R. at 87.) She 
testified that, in the normal course of her duties, she prepared billings that 
were sent out to people whom she "felt caused the damage." (R. at 88.) 
She went on to testify that repair supervisors provided her with what is 
called a Form 3886, which lists the number of man hours spent on any 
particular repair. (Exhibit P-2, reproduced infra at A-27.) She inputs 
these hours to a computer and "the computer then gives us a total for the 
bill, and then prints the bill." (R. at 91.) She was also permitted to 
testify, without further foundation, over the objection of Defendant Baker, 
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that the $2,060.33 total reflected on the exhibit represented wthe actual 
costs incurred by Mountain States TelephoneM in connection with the repair 
of the cable at issue. (R. at 93.) 
Ms. Nielsen acknowledged that she did not know what rate of 
pay the employees who repaired the cable at issue received, that she did 
not know what supplies were actually used in connection with the repair of 
the cable, that she did not know what tools were used on the job, that she 
did not know what the tools used had cost, that she did not know whether 
Mountain Bell had lost any revenue as a result of the cable being out of 
service, that she did not know which customers' service was interrupted 
and, generally, that she had no independent knowledge of anything except 
the man hours reported, which she had faithfully input to the computer. 
(R. at 96-98.) In fact, the witness's total ignorance of what the document 
was, how it was calculated, and what it demonstrated is graphically 
manifest by her testimony that "we did not charge for overtime hours." 
(R. at 89.) In fact, it was the unrefuted testimony of Plaintiff's employee 
who supervised the repairs, Gary Newkirk, that his employees received 
"right around $14.00 an hour" regular time and $21.00 per hour overtime. 
(R. at 110.) In the exhibit, however, 44 hours are billed at an average rate 
of $37.25 per hour, approximately three times the crew's actual regular rate 
of pay. 
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A. The Computer-Generated "Bill" is Hearsay and Inadmissible, 
It is of critical importance to note, at the outset, a fundamental 
distinction with respect to the computer-generated printout at issue in this 
case: It does not consist of information retrieved by Plaintiff's computer; 
instead, it consists almost entirely of information calculated by Plaintiff's 
computer. In other words, the question is not whether Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
is admissible for the purpose of demonstrating that 44 man hours were 
worked on this project1, but whether it is admissible for proving the 
reasonable value or reasonable cost of those repairs. While relatively few 
cases have dealt directly with the admissibility of computer-generated 
calculations as opposed to computer-generated printouts of retrieved 
information, the courts have consistently noted that the foundation 
necessary for such calculations is substantially greater than for mere 
retrievals. For example, in Illinois v. Bovio. 118 Ill.App.3d 836, 
455 NE.2d 829 (1983), the trial court's admission of computer calculations 
was held to be erroneous. On appeal, the Court noted that the foundation 
offered for the calculations did not demonstrate that the computer 
Actually, the testimony of Gary Newkirk, who supervised the repairs, 
was that he and four other men worked nine overtime hours each and his 
time sheet (Exhibit 2) demonstrated that two other individuals worked four 
hours each regular time some three days later. While these figures are not 
reconcilable with, and are indeed inconsistent with, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
which reflects 44 overtime hours, Appellant does not contest for the 
purposes of this appeal the number of hours worked. The reasonableness of 
the hours worked is subject to challenge, particularly in view of the fact 
that Mr. Newkirk's nine hours consisted entirely of "supervising" and 
procuring coffee, hot food, and other non-essential items. (See. R. at 107.) 
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equipment was standard and that there was little evidence concerning the 
method of preparation of the data to attest to its trustworthiness. The 
Court held: 
Systems, like the one apparently in question, which 
perform calculations must be scrutinized more 
thoroughly than those systems which merely retrieve 
information. . . . No testimony established that the 
computer program at the data center was standard, 
unmodified, and operated according to its instructions. 
On the basis of these gaps in the foundation 
requirement, we hold that the trial court erred in 
admitting the bank statement in evidence. . . . 
455 NE.2d at 833-34 (citations omitted). In the case presently before this 
Court, the foundation offered for Respondent's computer calculations was 
even less complete in that the only witness called to offer that foundation 
had absolutely no information concerning the nature of the program or the 
formulas or rates that it utilized. She knew only that she had typed in the 
number of man hours accurately.2 Under these circumstances, the proffered 
foundation was totally insufficient. 
Similarly, in Illinois v. Morman. 97 Ill.App.3d 556, 422 NE.2d 1065 
(1981), the Court placed emphasis upon the fact that a computer printout 
consisted merely of information retrieved (as opposed to calculated) by a 
2As noted, the witness's "knowledge" of the accuracy of the data that 
she input is highly questionable. She testified that the computer had 
treated all of the hours as regular time although the evidence demonstrated 
that the computer treated all of the hours as overtime. Moreover, 
Mr. Newkirk testified that 45 hours of overtime and eight hours of regular 
time had been devoted to the project, whereas the computer obviously based 
its calculations upon 44 hours of overtime and no regular hours. Such 
discrepancies, while mathematically insignificant, demonstrate the lack of 
trustworthiness inherent in Respondent's computer operations. 
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car rental company's computer in holding that it was admissible. In so 
holding, the Court noted: 
[T]he fact that the Avis computer was used to retrieve 
information rather than perform calculations 
necessitates less scrutiny into the nature of the 
computer. . . . 
422 NE.2d at 1073. 
In a case squarely on point, a utility's computer-generated 
damage calculations were held to be inadmissible to prove the value of 
damage to the utility company's facilities in Davton Power & Light Company 
v. Hershner, No. 1101 (Ohio Ct. App., filed March 27, 1981).3 In that case, 
a motorist negligently collided with a utility pole. The utility company 
filed suit for damage to its pole. In support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the utility submitted an extensive affidavit by the assistant 
supervisor of its accounting department. Attached to the affidavit were 
"work order cost summaries" similar to the computer-generated 'bill" 
received in this case as trial Exhibit 1 but with much more detail. The 
affidavit demonstrated that the work order cost summaries were prepared 
monthly in the ordinary course of the utility's business and utilized sound 
accounting principles. The affidavit went on to explain that the 
calculations were based upon the utility's cost experience "over a long 
period of time." In ruling that the foundation for these computer-generated 
calculations was inadequate, the Court held: 
3This unreported opinion, as retrieved via Lexis, is reproduced infra at 
A-7. 
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This Court recognizes that in today's business 
world, computers and computerized bookkeeping have 
become commonplace, and that the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule is intended to bring the 
realities of the business world into a court of law. 
In this case, however, DP&L is attempting to 
prove by computer printout its unliquidated damages. 
This can be contrasted to the use of computer 
printouts to show a liquidated amount due, such as on 
an account. Because of the difference between what 
the two types of computer printouts are intended to 
prove, this Court is not passing on a computer 
printout's introduction into evidence pursuant to [the 
business records exception] in general. Rather, we 
confine ourselves to computer printouts introduced for 
the purpose of proving unliquidated damages. 
Slip Op., infra at A-9. Having made the fundamental observation that the 
proffered evidence consisted of information calculated rather than retrieved 
by computer, the Court noted that the foundational affidavit also recited 
that the summary had been prepared in the ordinary course of business and 
"accurately reflects the cost incurred in the replacement of the pole." The 
Court ruled, however, that: 
These mere conclusions on the part of the 
foundation witness that the records were made in the 
ordinary course of business are not a sufficient 
foundation for the printouts' introduction into 
evidence. 
Specific proof must be presented that the 
computer records were made in the ordinary course of 
business. This would include testimony that the 
printouts were routinely made rather than specifically 
prepared for trial, and that they were relied on by 
DP&L as sufficiently accurate for business purposes. 
Further, the foundation witness must describe in 
detail any calculations or abbreviations appearing in 
the printout. Abbreviations in DP&L's work cost 
13 
summaries are not explained. In addition, the original 
source of the information contained in the printout 
must be shown, and the reliability and trustworthiness 
of the information must be established. These 
requirements were not met by DP&L in its efforts to 
prove unliquidated damages by the work cost 
summaries. 
Slip Op., infra at A-9-10, emphasis added. For precisely the same reasons, 
the computer-generated calculations that form the sole basis of the damage 
evidence in this case are inadmissible. 
Ms. Nielsen admitted that she had no information as to how the 
calculations were prepared and she candidly acknowledged that they were 
prepared solely for the purpose of submitting a bill to those parties 
believed by the Respondent to be liable for the damage to its facilities. 
Accordingly, the foundation is inadequate both because the only witness 
attempting to provide foundation could not explain how the amounts were 
calculated or the rates that had been applied to them and her testimony 
makes clear that they were prepared solely for the purpose of pursuing a 
damage claim and not in the ordinary course of business. By her own 
testimony, Ms. Nielsen lacked the knowledge that would enable her to 
provide an adequate foundation. She did not know what mathematical 
manipulations the computer performed, she did not know what rates were 
applied, she did not know what factors the computer considered. Without a 
foundation as to the basis of the mathematical calculations performed by 
the computer, the dollar figures resulting from those calculations are 
utterly meaningless. 
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While the courts have created no specific rules as to the identity 
or occupation of the witness attempting to lay a foundation for computer-
generated evidence, the courts have wisely and consistently required that 
the individual have reasonably specific knowledge about the basic methods 
by which the documents were prepared. For example, in Monarch Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Genser. 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475 
(1977), the Court was required to determine the sufficiency of the 
foundation for computer-generated mortgage payment records. The Court 
held: 
No specific person must be called to supply the 
foundation testimony for the admission of business 
records. However, whoever testifies must be in a 
position to supply the foundation [required], i.e., the 
regular course of business, the time of making of the 
record and the event recorded, the sources of 
information recorded, and finally, the methods and 
circumstances of the computer record's preparation. 
This Court agrees [that] a proper foundation for 
(computer) evidence is laid by testimony of a witness 
who is familiar with the computerized records and the 
methods under which they were made so as to satisfy 
the court that the methods, the sources of information, 
and the time of preparation render such evidence 
trustworthy. Thus, in providing information as to the 
methods of preparation, the foundation witness should 
also be able Mto testify as to the type of computer 
employed, the permanent nature of the record storage, 
and how daily processing of information to be fed into 
the computer was conducted, resulting in permanent 
records." . . . 
383 A.2d at 485-86 (citations omitted). In the case at hand, Ms. Nielsen 
was admittedly unable to offer any of this foundation except that she 
accurately input information supplied to her by other company records. 
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The fundamental principle embodied in each of the hearsay 
exceptions set forth in Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is 
trustworthiness. With respect to business records, the theory is that if a 
business prepares a record in its ordinary manner before a claim or dispute 
has arisen and relies upon that record in its day-to-day operations, then 
there is strong practical reason to anticipate that the record will be 
reasonably accurate, unbiased, and worthy of credibility. None of these 
crucial factors are shown to be present, however, with respect to the 
computer-generated damage calculations proffered by the Respondent as the 
only evidence of its damages. Logic demonstrates that the utility has every 
reason to make those figures as large as possible. The "bill" was created 
only after the damage had occurred and for the specific purpose of billing 
those deemed responsible. The record was not prepared as part of the 
utility's ordinary, on-going billing activities, it was prepared to support and 
prove an unliquidated claim. Similarly, there is no evidence that the utility 
uses similar records, or the computer program that generates them, for any 
independent business purpose other than attempting to recover damage 
claims. Accordingly, the concept of trustworthiness which is central to the 
"business record exception" is entirely lacking with respect to Exhibit 1. 
The trustworthiness of materials offered as business records on 
the basis of the business records exception has frequently been held by 
courts to justify the admission of documents (when demonstrated) or to 
require the refusal of documents (when not demonstrated). For example, in 
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Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students International Meditation Society. 
501 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1974), the Court held that: 
A crucial aspect of the business-records exception is 
that entries be prepared as a regular part of the 
business . . . . Otherwise, there is no basis for the 
presumption of reliability which is at the heart of the 
exception. 
501 F.2d at 554 (citations omitted, original emphasis). The Court went on 
to hold that calculations prepared by business employees were not 
admissible because they had been prepared only after the manager of the 
business became suspicious that the counts being provided to him by a 
customer were not accurate. 
Similarly, in United States v. Kim. 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
a Telex message was held inadmissible as a business record even though the 
Defendant offering it proved that it had been received by one bank from 
another bank. The basis of the ruling was that while the message was a 
HTelex and while the bank did receive such messages in its operations, this 
message had been prompted by the particular matter in dispute." In so 
holding, the court relied upon the comments of the Advisory Committee 
associated with Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
[T]he telex does not fall within the business 
records exception [because] it was not made for a 
regular business purpose. In order for a document to 
qualify as a business record, it must have been the 
"regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum . . . ." The Advisory Committee on 
Proposed Rules explained the reason for this 
requirement: 
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The element of unusual reliability 
of business records is said 
variously to be supplied . . . by 
actual experience of business in 
relying upon them, or by a duty 
to make an accurate record as 
part of a continuing job or 
occupation. 
595 F.2d at 761 (citations omitted, footnote omitted). As already noted, the 
computer calculations offered by Respondent in this case are not relied 
upon by the Respondent for any independent business purpose, only for 
proving its damage claims. They have, accordingly, no more reliability than 
a printout prepared by an attorney specializing in representing plaintiffs in 
personal injury actions who input the client's age, injuries, occupation, and 
other factors into a computer which then generated a prognostication of 
the damages which she was entitled to recover. 
Legal writers have also emphasized the need for caution in 
providing adequate foundation for computer-generated calculations. One 
writer notes: 
In light of complex computer systems' susceptibility to 
numerous possibilities for error, the question arises 
whether additional safeguards should be required before 
computerized records are admitted into evidence 
Judges and commentators who have considered the 
foundation accorded conventional records to be equally 
satisfactory for computer-generated ones have failed to 
account for the significant differences between the two 
types of evidence. . . . There is a serious risk with 
computer records that the judge, and perhaps even 
more so the jury, will be overly impressed by the 
computer's mystique and will unnecessarily accept its 
output as reliable. 
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There are at least five major classifications of 
electronic data processing errors. Technologists label 
environmentally induced errors and hardware failures as 
mechanical shortcomings. They consider systems design 
and programming errors, operating mistakes, and input 
errors to be human errors. 
Programming errors . in any one of the various 
levels are relatively common. A single mistake may be 
seriously compounded if a computer obediently uses an 
erroneous instruction several times. Programming 
errors are notorious for producing absurd results. 
A number of judges have insisted that litigants 
seeking the admission of computer evidence under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule offer an 
evidentiary foundation responsive to the possible errors 
. . . . It is these cases that set the desirable 
precedent, rather than those which permit entry of 
computer material on a basis similar to that afforded 
manual business records. 
Judges who have expressed concern about the 
reliability of computer data have generally preferred 
that high ranking employees of computer departments, 
as opposed to accountants or comptrollers, describe the 
machinery and procedures. 
N°te, A Reconsideration of the Admissibility of Computer-Generated 
Evidence, 126 U. of Pa. L.Rev. 425 at 437-39, 441, 446-48 (footnotes and 
citations omitted). Another writer notes: 
[T]he traditional foundation requirements of the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule are 
ineffective to ensure the reliability of a computer 
printout. A review of the case law suggests that the 
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courts have failed to recognize this problem and 
consequently have not developed an adequate test. 
The reliability of the computer printout is the 
most important factor in determining whether the 
record should be admitted under the business records 
exception. . . . Selection of input data, processing 
input data, and programming are the primary causes of 
human errors. . . . 
[A] computer printout poses a set of problems not 
common to a traditional record keeping system0 The 
result is that the statutory foundation requirements 
developed for testing the reliability of traditional 
business records are inadequate when applied to 
computer printouts. 
Note, Appropriate Foundation Requirements for Admitting Computer 
Printouts Into Evidence. 59 Wash. Univ. Law Quarterly 59 at 62, 75, and 78 
(footnotes omitted). At the very least, computer-generated calculations 
must be admitted only with the foundation required by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Such foundation was clearly not established by the testimony in 
this case. Accordingly, the computer-generated document received as 
Exhibit 1 was inadmissible and the trial court erred in admitting that 
document. 
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B. There Was No Evidence of Any Proximate Causal Relationship Between 
Defendant Baker's Conduct and the Damages Calculated in the Computer-
Generated "Bill." 
It is, of course, a fundamental rule of negligence law that the 
defendant is liable only for those damages proximately caused by his 
conduct and which, but for his conduct, would not have occurred. Although 
there was no foundation provided as to how the dollar amount set forth in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 were calculated, it is apparent that the document 
attempts to include a wide variety of indirect costs. 
While some courts do allow the inclusion of some indirect 
expenses in the measure of damages for the loss of or damage to utility 
property, the cases uniformly require a showing that such costs were caused 
by the defendant's conduct. In other words, no court allows a utility to be 
more than made whole at the expense of an individual who has 
unintentionally damaged its facilities. 
The question of the recoverability of such indirect expenses was 
before the court in Davton Power & Light v. Hershner. supra. In holding 
that cost summaries more detailed than, but otherwise essentially identical 
with, the computer-generated "bill" relied upon by Respondent in the 
present case were inadequate to prove a utility's damages, the court 
attempted to articulate the distinction between indirect costs appropriately 
included for accounting purposes and indirect costs recoverable in a legal 
action: 
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[The defendant] further asserts that accounting 
procedures cannot establish principles of tort liability. 
[He] maintains that there must be a demonstration by 
DP&L of a proximate relationship between the 
company's alleged damages and [his] tort In [his] 
view, there was no firsthand testimony or affidavits of 
any witness regarding proximate causation, and 
therefore DP&L has relied solely upon accounting 
niceties and computer-generated summaries to provide 
this vital link in the tort-proximate causation-damage 
claim of proof required in all negligence cases. 
A public utility may recover direct expenses as 
damages for the negligent destruction of its utility 
pole,, But in order for the public utility to recover 
indirect overhead expenses, it must come forth with 
evidence proving that the indirect expenses would not 
have been paid but for the negligence of defendant. 
Slip Op., infra at A-11. In the present case, any such evidence is wholly 
lacking. 
Another case involving damage to utility facilities directly 
addressing the question of the recoverability of indirect damages is 
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company v. Brock. No. C-830137 (Ohio Ct. App., 
filed December 21, 1983)4 in which the utility sought recovery for a pole 
negligently damaged by the defendant. The trial focused on the work 
required to repair the damages and the accounting system used to compute 
the cost of those repairs. The utility presented the testimony of nine 
witnesses and nineteen trial exhibits. The court began its analysis with the 
observations that the recoverable damages were "limited to those injuries 
4The text of this unreported opinion, retrieved via Lexis, is 
reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-12. 
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flowing directly from, and as the proximate and natural result of, the 
defendant's wrong" and that the task of determining the appropriate 
measure of damages was complicated when the plaintiff itself made the 
repairs. (Slip Op., infra at A-13.) As Respondent has attempted to do in 
this case, the utility presented testimony at trial of its actual costs and 
then increased those costs by various overhead factors. In effect, the 
Court held that the utility could not rely exclusively upon accounting 
principles to prove its damages: 
With respect to labor, the cost charged to the 
defendant was the product of the total, direct labor 
hours expended by the individual employees within each 
of several classifications of employees assigned to 
replace the pole times an average wage rate for each 
employee classification. While this may be sound 
accounting practice, it is not acceptable with respect 
to the law of damages. . . . 
The method currently used to calculate labor costs 
gives an average cost for an employee within a certain 
classification rather than the actual cost of the 
particular employee who made the repair. The law of 
damages provides that only those damages proximately 
or directly caused by the defendant's negligence are 
compensable. Thus, as to this one aspect of the 
judgment, the damage caused by the defendant can be 
and should have been directly traced to the cost of a 
particular employee's labor, rather than the cost of 
some mythical "average" employee. The plaintiff failed 
to prove that all the elements of damage presented to 
the court were proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
Slip Op., infra at A-14. The Court went on to note that, with respect to 
the other, "overhead," expenses, there had been no proper showing of direct 
or proximate causation: 
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[T]he law of damages is just what its name 
implies — a legal concept, not an accounting concept. 
The two disciplines are not synonymous and their 
distinct purposes must not be confused. With respect 
to an operation such as that of the plaintiff or a 
manufacturer, the purpose of the accountant, as stated 
by plaintiff's accounting supervisor, is to take all the 
costs of operating a business and distribute them in a 
fair and equitable manner to each job done by the 
business. . . . While the law is concerned that all the 
"costs" of all torts committed against a plaintiff are 
recovered, the law is not concerned with whether each 
tortfeasor bears an equal portion of the total overhead 
in relation to the direct costs. To the contrary, the 
purpose of the law is to require the tortfeasor to pay 
only those costs incurred because of his actions. 
Accordingly, the law requires the tortfeasor to pay for 
those overhead costs which, with reasonable diligence 
by the victim, can be directly attributed with 
reasonable certainty to the tortfeasor. 
[T]he defendant was charged with a portion of 
certain costs that were directly incurred because of 
other accidents but not directly incurred because of 
the defendant's accident. Such charges are not in 
conformity with the rule previously stated that one is 
liable only for those damages that directly flow from 
the injury sustained. . . . 
The thrust of our decision today is not that 
overhead costs are never recoverable. It is our 
purpose to point out that some overhead costs are not 
attributable to a particular defendant and cannot be 
charged to him. The question in each case to be 
decided by the trier of fact is: what is the amount of 
indirect costs (overhead) which has been proved with 
reasonable certainty to have been directly and 
proximately caused by defendant's negligence? 
Slip Op., infra at A-15-17. Because of the manner in which Respondent 
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chose to present its trial testimony and the virtual lack of foundation for 
its sole damage exhibit, these critical questions cannot be addressed. 
Similarly, in another case involving damage to utility facilities, 
the Court held in Davton Power & Light Company v. Puterbaugh. 
No. 79 CA 13, (Ohio Ct. App., March 7, 1980)5: 
[The utility] presented no evidence whatsoever 
that these so-called indirect overhead costs would not 
have been paid, notwithstanding the negligent actions 
of [the defendant]. No evidence was presented to 
show, for example, that due to [the defendant's] 
negligence, extra employees had to be called in to 
work, thereby necessitating extra payroll taxes, 
insurance, etc. In the absence of evidence that [the 
utility's] indirect costs were incurred as a result of 
[the defendant's] negligence, [the utility] has failed to 
demonstrate that the damages it seeks to recover flow 
directly from and as a natural, probable, and proximate 
result of the wrong complained of. 
Slip Op., infra at A-24. The Court went on to note its agreement with the 
proposition that: 
The supervision costs, unless directly connected with 
the repair of the pole and line, the store expenses, and 
the general overhead, are such expenses that would 
have been incurred and paid, without regard to the 
breaking of the pole. They constitute a part of the 
operating expenses of the plaintiff and this Court can 
see no relation of these costs to the negligence of the 
defendant. . . . 
Id., infra at A-24. These observations are equally applicable to the facts of 
the case now before this Court. The Respondent utility made no effort 
whatsoever to present any evidence of any nature whatsoever as to the 
5A copy of the unreported opinion, obtained from the Clerk of the 
Court, is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-18. 
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critical issue of proximate causation. Moreover, the Respondent utility in 
this case did not even present direct evidence of what supplies were used. 
Mr. Newkirk testified (R. at 110) that he kept no list of the materials that 
he used and Ms. Nielsen testified (R. at 96) that she had no knowledge of 
what supplies were used. Magically, however, the computer printout places 
a precise dollar value on these supplies. (See. Exhibit P-l reproduced infra 
at A-26.) At best, it must be presumed that the value placed upon the 
supplies was based upon some perceived average supply cost but the 
utilization of such average values is inappropriate.6 The trial court erred 
in awarding damages based on such inappropriate evidence. 
C. There Being No Admissible Proof of Damages, the Trial Court Erred in 
Entering Judgment. 
As noted above, the only evidence of the Respondent utility's 
damages was the computer-generated calculations. These were admitted 
without proper foundation and should have been excluded under the hearsay 
rule. Moreover, the Respondent utility failed to present any evidence that 
the indirect overhead items — that more than doubled its actual damages— 
6It is no more appropriate in this case involving property damage to 
utility facilities to rely upon average costs and expenses than it would be 
in a personal injury action to award medical expenses, lost wages, or 
general damages based upon what average or typical personal injury 
plaintiffs sustain, allege, or recover. While such average values may be 
perfectly appropriate and defensible from an accounting standpoint, they are 
anathema to the law of damages. 
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were directly or proximately caused by the conduct of either of the 
defendants in this action. 
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the Respondent utility bears 
little, if any, relevance to the reasonable value of the repairs necessitated 
by the damage to the telephone cable. Yet it is the reasonable cost of 
such repairs that it the measure of damage. For example, in a simple 
automobile accident case, the fact that the plaintiff spends $5,000.00 
repairing his vehicle has little bearing on what he is entitled to recover. 
He is entitled to recover only the reasonable and ordinary cost of those 
repairs. Accordingly, the computer-generated calculations, even if arguendo 
admissible, demonstrate nothing more than what the utility claims it cost to 
repair the damage. This evidence is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible 
under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, on the true question of the 
reasonable and ordinary cost of effecting these repairs. 
The total lack of relevance of the computer-generated 
calculations to the true question of the reasonable and ordinary cost of the 
repairs is demonstrated by the fact that no one knows what supplies were 
actually used, yet a supply expense appears in the calculation. The lack of 
relevance is also demonstrated by the fact that the calculations apparently 
include cost factors related to aerial ladder trucks, which were obviously 
totally unnecessary to the repair of this underground cable.7 
7Mr. Newkirk testified that he and his four employees simply drove 
whatever company vehicles they were assigned to the job site and 
acknowledged that the aerial ladder trucks were not needed on this 
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There being no admissible evidence of any damage actually 
sustained by the Respondent utility, the trial court erred in entering any 
judgment against Appellant. Having failed to prove its damages, a no cause 
of action dismissal should have been entered against the Respondent utility. 
POINT II, DEFENDANT BAKER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
Defendant Baker moved both at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case 
(R. at 114) and at the end of the trial (R. at 160) for the dismissal of the 
Plaintiff's case upon the basis that the Plaintiff had demonstrated no 
negligence on the part of Defendant Baker. The trial court denied both 
motions. 
A. Plaintiff Was Not Entitled to the Benefit of the Prima Facie Evidence 
Provision of Section 54-8a-6(2). 
At the trial, the Respondent utility offered no evidence of any 
negligence on the part of either of the Defendants. The utility called only 
two witnesses, its records clerk, Ms. Nielsen, and its repair supervisor, 
Mr. Newkirk. Both admitted that they had no knowledge of how the cable 
had been damaged. (R. at 97-98 and 106.) 
Faced with the absence of any evidence of any negligence on the 
part of either of the Defendants, the Respondent utility relied upon the 
particular job. (See. R. at 113.) 
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provisions of Section 54-8a-6(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
That section states: 
An underground facility damaged by a person who 
fails to comply with Section 54-8a-4 is prima facie 
evidence that the damage was caused through the 
negligence of that person. 
It must be noted that failure to comply with Section 54-8a-4 is a condition 
precedent to the prima facie evidence provision of the statute. 
Section 54-8a-4 provides, in relevant part, that: 
No person, except in an emergency or while 
gardening or tilling private ground, may make an 
excavation without first notifying each public utility 
company . . . . 
Thus, the requirement of notification to a utility is conditional. There is 
no requirement of notification if Man emergency" exists. In this case, the 
Respondent utility offered no evidence on the question of an emergency. 
Accordingly, it did not demonstrate any violation of Section 54-8a-4 by 
either of the Defendants. Consequently, it did not establish the facts 
necessary to trigger the prima facie evidence provision of 
Section 54-8a-6(2). 
Accordingly, since the Respondent utility neither demonstrated 
any breach by either Defendant of Section 54-8a-4 nor any negligence on 
the part of either Defendant, the Respondent utility failed to establish a 
necessary element (i.e., negligence) of its case. Accordingly, the motion to 
dismiss at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case (R. at 160) should have been 
. granted by the trial court. 
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Unfortunately, throughout the trial, the trial court demonstrated 
an eagerness to assist the Respondent utility by limiting the issues. For 
example, before the trial commenced, before opening statements had even 
been made, the trial court observed: 
Gentlemen, before we start taking evidence, from the 
pleadings, it would appear that there's little question 
about the damage that was done to the plaintiff's 
property. Is that really in dispute? 
R. at 81. Although Mr. Baker's counsel stipulated that the backhoe had 
contacted the cable, it was repeatedly made clear that the amount of that 
damage was in dispute. (E.g.. R. at 82, 83, and 84.) Having learned that 
the question of damages was in dispute, the trial court then manifest an 
eagerness to predetermine liability: 
THE COURT: Then, as far as the plaintiff's claim 
is concerned, is it now just a 
question of establishing the damages, 
the cost of repair? 
MR. ENGLAND: I believe — in our opinion, yes, 
Your Honor. We'll have testimony 
to the amount of the bill and so 
forth. 
MR. PARKEN: Well, if I understand the Court's 
question, the Court is saying that 
liability is clear or obvious. 
THE COURT: No, I am not talking about liability. 
The fact is the cable was cut, it's a 
question now of who is liable. 
MR. PARKEN: If anyone. 
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THE COURT: If anyone, and it's also -- I think 
that's a matter that's primarily at 
issue between the defendant and 
cross-defendant. 
MR. PARKEN: Well, I don't know that I agree. 
There's certainly an issue between 
the two defendants as to who should 
bear the responsibility, if either is 
liable to the plaintiff. The question 
THE COURT: Well, the - it seems to me that 
this is the point we have, sir. The 
law requires certain things be done. 
MR. PARKEN: Well -
THE COURT: - it's stipulated that certain things 
were not done. The line was cut. 
That has all been stipulated to. 
R. at 84-85. (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the trial court, before 
opening statements were offered, before the first witness had been sworn, 
and before a shred of evidence had been received, had already determined 
that, if a utility's line had been damaged, at least one of the defendants 
was to be held liable. That belief, as demonstrated by the foregoing 
statutes, is entirely contrary to Utah law. 
Moreover, the trial court's comments in response to counsel's 
argument in support of the motion to dismiss demonstrate that the Court 
misunderstood the statutory scheme: 
THE COURT: Well, the section you cite says that 
this section is inapplicable to an 
excavation made during an 
emergency, which involves danger to 






the other hand, the prima facie 
provision is sufficient to carry on 
the case and I would deny plaintiff's 
motion for judgment and I would 
deny your motion at this time, sir. 
Excuse me, Your Honor. Could you 
tell me which statute you just read? 
I just read 54-8a-8, sub 3. 
Okay. Well, sub 3 is not - that's 
not where we're talking about, if I 
may. 
I know that, but this defines — it 
says that it's — when it's — defines 
emergency0 It says health, life, or 
property, and I think I would accept 
that as the definition intended. 
R. at 115-116. In reality, what the trial court was reading related only to 
a "civil penalty," which was not even sought by the Plaintiff. Moreover, 
the definition that the court read was clearly limited to the civil penalty 
section because it begins with the phrase, "This section is inapplicable to . 
. . ." (Section 54-8a-8(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).) It 
would also seem likely that, particularly in the absence of any evidence to 
the contrary, raw sewage overflowing into a residential basement and 
running down a gravel driveway in a residential area would "involve danger 
to life . . . or property." 
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B. The Evidence Was Undisputed That an Emergency Existed and That All 
Backhoe Operations Were Conducted in a Careful and Prudent Manner, 
Even if the trial court's refusal to dismiss Plaintiff's action for 
its failure to prove either its damages or any negligence on the part of 
either of the Defendants can be justified on the basis that the existence of 
an emergency is an affirmative defense under the statutory scheme, the 
trial court still erred because the existence of such an emergency was 
clearly demonstrated by the unrefuted evidence. Lyle Crawley, Defendant 
Baker's employee who received Defendant Hansen's telephone call for help, 
testified that Defendant Hansen told him that raw sewage was coming up 
through his driveway and that he needed immediate assistance (R. at 118). 
Mr. Crawley also testified that, in the ordinary course of Defendant Baker's 
business, such conditions were deemed emergencies and were given priority 
over all other types of work. (M-) Mr. Crawley also testified that when 
he arrived at Mr. Hansen's residence, he observed raw sewage leaking from 
the sewer line, that it was running down the middle of his driveway, and 
that there was enough of a leak to constitute a real problem. (R. at 119.) 
Roger Duvall, the backhoe operator who went to assist Defendant Hansen, 
also testified that sewage breaks were given priority because "raw sewage is 
a health hazard." (R. at 131.) He also noted that "broken sewer lines have 
top priority because they're a real potential health hazard[;] broken water 
lines have second priority." (R. at 132.) He noted that when he arrived at 
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the jobsite, he noted "a cesspool of raw sewage bubbling up through the 
ground, I would say approximately 5 foot diameter." (R. at 133.) 
Defendant Hansen also verified in his testimony the severity of 
the problem and confirmed that he had told Defendant Baker's company 
that "I had raw sewage in my basement and it was running down also in my 
driveway . . . ." (R. at 150.) He testified that he considered repairing the 
sewer line to be a matter of great urgency, that he stayed home from work 
to take care of it, and that it would not have been possible to live in his 
house over the weekend had the sewer not been cleared. (See, R. at 158.) 
At trial, the Respondent utility presented no evidence to the 
contrary. Accordingly, the record is totally unrefuted that there was a 
serious problem with raw sewage running down a gravel driveway and 
bubbling up through the ground in a H5-foot cesspool" in a residential area. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court was obligated, as a matter of law, 
to find that an emergency existed. Accordingly, the trial court misapplied 
relevant law in granting to the Respondent utility the benefit of the prima 
facie evidence provision contained in the statute. 
Moreover, the record was equally undisputed that all backhoe 
operations were conducted in a slow, careful, and cautious manner in 
accordance with usual industry practices. The backhoe operator, Roger 
Duvall, testified without any contradiction that he had operated a backhoe 
in residential areas on approximately 300 occasions (R. at 130) and that he 
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would dig no deeper with the backhoe bucket than had previously been 
explored manually with a shovel: 
Question: [H]ow much dirt would you have been 
cutting through with each swath of the 
backhoe? 
Answer: It would depend on how deep he went 
with the shovel, it would be six to eight, 
ten inches. 
Question: But you wouldn't go any deeper than the 
shovel went? 
Answer: No deeper than the depth of the shovel. 
R. at 137. He also testified that this procedure of exploring manually with 
a shovel first was an acceptable and widely used one within the Salt Lake 
area. (R. at 137.) He testified that his backhoe could dig at various 
speeds but that he operated Mslow and carefulH at all times because he knew 
he was in close proximity to a clay sewer pipe, which is extremely 
vulnerable. (R. at 139.) Moreover, he discovered the communications cable 
before damaging it, asked Defendant Hansen what it was, verified that 
Defendant Hansen had told him it was a tree root, and proceeded only after 
these multiple reassurances. 
In light of the strong evidence that Mr. Duvall operated the 
backhoe in a slow, careful, and cautious manner and the unrefuted 
testimony that he discovered the utilities cable before damaging it and 
proceeded to apply force against it only after having been (mistakenly) 
reassured by Defendant Hansen that it was a tree root, the Respondent 
utility presented not a shred of evidence of any negligence on the part of 
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any employee of Defendant Baker. Accordingly, since the prima facie 
evidence provision of the statute was inapplicable and since no evidence of 
any negligence on the part of the backhoe operator was presented, the trial 
court's Finding of negligence on the part of Defendant Baker's employee is 
directly contrary to the unrefuted evidence. 
It should be noted that any attempt to find that the backhoe 
operator was negligent simply because the Blue Stakes program was not 
called is contrary to the statutory scheme. The statute says that the Blue 
Stakes program must be contacted unless an emergency exists. In this case, 
the evidence was unrefuted that an emergency did exist. Accordingly, 
failure to call the Blue Stakes program cannot constitute either negligence 
or negligence per se because the applicable statute did not require contact 
with the Blue Stakes program under the existing circumstances. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT 
BAKER'S CROSSCLAIM. 
If either of the Defendants was liable to the Respondent utility, 
then the liability should rest with Respondent Hansen. The evidence was 
uncontradicted that it was his decision not to contact the Blue Stakes 
program. Mr. Crawley testified that Mr. Hansen said that he knew "where 
all the utilities are on [his] property and [that] there's nothing anywhere 
near." (R. at 117.) Moreover, Defendant Baker's company offered to send 
Respondent Hansen a "full crew" (consisting of a backhoe operator and a 
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"laborer to spot for utility lines") but Mr. Hansen wanted to "operate the 
shovel" himself. (See. R. at 134-135.) The backhoe operator, Roger Duvall, 
testified that he explained to Mr. Hansen what was needed of him and that 
it appeared to him that Mr. Hansen knew what was expected of him. 
(R. at 135.) 
Moreover, Mr. Duvall located, before damaging it, the utility 
cable and asked Mr. Hansen to ascertain what it was: 
Mr. Duvall: As I was reaching out, Mr. Hansen had 
gone ahead of me with the shovel, as I 
came down, I started to drag the bucket 
towards me and I felt tension on my 
bucket. And I was only ~ well, at this 
point, I think I was approximately two to, 
two-and-a-half-feet deep, maybe three 
feet deep, and I felt tension on the 
bucket, so I immediately backed my 
bucket up, and lifted it straight up-
well, as the bucket had came forward, 
there was — the dirt had fallen over, 
ahead of the bucket, and I noticed a 
black — 
Question: Object? 
Answer: - object going across my bucket, so I 
immediately backed up, I lifted the bucket 
and pointed to Mr. Hansen and asked him 
to investigate and see what it was . . . . 
Mr. Hansen got down with the shovel and 
cleaned around it, he looked up at me, 
and he said something, I was 
approximately ten feet from him in the 
backhoe, the backhoe was — motor was 
sounding. He said something, I did not 
quite hear what he said, so I hollered 
down to him, I says, what did you say, 
and he says, tree root. I repeated, it's a 
tree root, and he said, yes, tear it out. 
So, I put my bucket back, I dropped it 
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down to that point, and I started to curl 
it. . . . There was an excessive amount 
of tension, I did not feel it was a tree 
root, I uncurled my bucket, lifted it up, 
and I looked at him and says, check it 
again. He got down in the trench, he 
looked up at me, and he says, it's some 
kind of a cable. 
R. at 138-139. 
In his testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he had been 
offered a crew but desired only a backhoe operator, offering to do the rest 
of the work himself (R. at 150), and also acknowledged that he had been 
asked to identify the object that Mr. Duvall had unearthed prior to the 
damage to that object (R. at 159). He also acknowledged that he 
mistakenly told Mr. Duvall it was a tree root. (R. at 159.) 
Accordingly, it was Respondent Hansen who requested that the 
Blue Stakes program not be called; it was Respondent Hansen who stated 
that he did not want a full crew; it was Respondent Hansen who agreed to 
act as the "spotter" for the operation; and it was Respondent Hansen who 
mistakenly identified the telephone cable as a tree root after Defendant 
Baker's employee had discovered the object without damaging it. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court's Findings that there was no negligence 
on the part of Defendant Hansen and that all of the negligence was that of 
the backhoe operator are directly contrary to the unrefuted evidence 
received at trial. Thus, in the event that the trial court determined that 
Defendant Baker had liability to the Respondent utility, the trial court was 
also obligated to grant Defendant Baker judgment against Respondent 
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Hansen on the crossclaim since all of the negligence and fault was that of 
Respondent Hansen. The trial court erred in dismissing the crossclaim. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no admissible evidence of the damages claimed by the 
Respondent utility. There was no evidence of any negligence on the part 
of Defendant Baker's backhoe operator. There was unrefuted evidence that 
the raw sewage leaking from the sewer line constituted an emergency. 
There was unrefuted evidence that it was at Respondent Hansen's decision 
that the Blue Stakes program not be called, that he act as the "spotter," 
and that it was Respondent Hansen who mistakenly identified the 
communications cable prior to its damage. 
Under these circumstances, a judgment of no cause of action and 
dismissal should have been entered against the Plaintiff. In the alternative, 
a judgment of indemnification should have been entered in favor of 
Defendant Baker against Respondent Hansen. The matter should be 
remanded to the trial court with instructions that a judgment of dismissal 
be entered against the Plaintiff. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1987. 
PARKEN & KECK 
By 
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DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND UTILITY 
FACILITIES 
Civil penalty for damage — Action 
by public utility, cable operator, 
or county attorney — Excep-
tions — Remedies supplemen-
tal. 
Association for mutual receipt of no-
tification of excavation activi-
ties, 
54-8a-7. Notice of damage — Repairs. 54-Sa-10. Installation of fiberoptic cables. 
54-8a-l. Purpose of chapter. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to protect underground facilities from de-
struction, damage, or dislocation in order to prevent death or injury to per-
sons, damage to private and public property, or the loss of service to the 
public. 
54-8a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Excavation" means any operation in which earth, rock, or other 
material on or below the ground is moved or otherwise displaced by 
means of tools, equipment, or explosives, and includes grading,, trenching, 
digging, ditching, drilling, augering, tunnelling, scraping, and cable or 
pipe plowing and driving. 
(2) "Underground facility" means any personal property which is bur-
ied or placed below ground level for use in the storage or conveyance of 
water, sewage, electronic, telephonic or telegraphic communications, tele-
vision or telecommunication signals, electric energy, oil, gas, or other 
substances, including but not limited to, pipes, sewers, conduits, cables, 
fiberoptic cables, valves, lines, wires, manholes, attachments, and those 
parts of poles below ground. 
(3) "Person" means an individual, firm, joint venture, partnership, cor-
poration, association, municipality, public agency, governmental unit, 
department, or agency, or a trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal repre-
sentative thereof. 
(4) "Business day" means any day other than Saturday, Sunday, or a 
legal holiday. 
(5) "Cable operator" means any person who provides cable service over 
a cable system. 
(6) "Cable service" means the transmission to subscribers of video or 
other programming. 
(7) "Cable system" means a facility, consisting of a set of closed trans-
mission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control 
equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes video 
programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a 
community. It does not include: (a) a facility that serves only to retrans-
mit the television signals of one or more television broadcast stations; or 
(b) a facility that serves only subscribers in one or more multiple unit 
dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless the 
facility uses any public right-of-way. 
54-8a-3. Information filed with county clerk and recorder. 
Every public utility and cable operator shall file the name of every munici-
pality, city, or town with the county clerk and recorder of a county in which it 
has underground facilities, and a list containing the name of the public utility 
or cable operator and the title, telephone number, and address of its represen-
tative designated to receive calls concerning excavation. In counties where an 
association as provided in § 54-8a-9 is established, the telephone number of 
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that association shall be filed with the county clerk and recorder on behalf of 
all participating public utilities and cable operators. 
54-8a-4. Notice of excavation with power equipment. 
No person, except in an emergency or while gardening or tilling private 
ground, may make an excavation without first notifying each public utility 
company, private culinary water company, or cable operator which may have 
underground facilities in the area of the proposed excavation. Initial notice 
shall be given by telephone or in person not less than two business days nor 
more than seven days before the commencement of excavation and shall in-
clude the proposed excavation's anticipated location, dimensions, and dura-
tion. If an excavation on a single project lasts more than 14 days, the excava-
tor shall give such notice at least once each 14 days during the continuation of 
the project. If there is an association as provided in § 54-8a-9 in the county, a 
call to that association is notice to each public utility and cable operator in the 
county. 
54-8a-5. Marking of underground facilities. 
A public utility or cable operator, upon receipt of the notice required by 
§ 54-8a-4, shall advise the excavator as promptly as practical, but in no event 
later than one business day after notice, of the location of its underground 
facilities in the area proposed for excavation by marking such facilities with 
stakes, paint, or in some other customary way, indicating horizontal location 
within 24 inches of the outside dimensions of both sides of the underground 
facility. Each marking shall be effective for not more than 15 days from the 
date it is made. No person may begin excavation before the location and 
marking is complete or before two business days have expired from the date of 
initial notification. 
54-8a-6. Excavator's duties and liabilities. 
(1) A person who is informed under § 54-8a-5 is not excused from excavat-
ing in a careful and prudent manner, nor is that person excused from liability 
for damage or injury which results from negligent excavation. 
(2) An underground facility damaged by a person who fails to comply with 
§ 54-8a-4 is prima facie evidence that the damage was caused through the 
newpence of that person,. """ " ~ ' 
54-8a-7- Notice of damage — Repairs. 
A person who in the course of excavation contacts or damages an under-
ground facility shall immediately notify the designated representative of the 
appropriate public utility or cable operator. Upon receipt of notice, the repre-
sentative shall immediately dispatch personnel to examine the underground 
facility, and, if necessary, the personnel shall make repairs. 
54-8a-8. Civil penalty for damage — Action by public util-
ity, cable operator, or county attorney — Excep-
tions — Remedies supplemental. 
(1) Any person who excavates without first complying with §§ 54-8a-4 and 
54-8a-5 and who damages, dislocates, or disturbs an underground facility is, 
upon proof of negligence, subject to a civil penalty of up to the maximum fine 
for "a class Bmisdemeanor under § 76-3-301 for the first offense and also for 
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each subsequent offense. 
(2) Actions to recover the civil penalties under this section shall be brought 
either by the public utility or the cable operator whose underground facilities 
are damaged or by the county attorney of the county in which the damage 
occurs. All penalties recovered from such action shall be paid into the Genera] 
Fund 
(3) This section is inapplicable to an excavation made during an emergency 
which involves danger to life, health, or property if reasonable precautions are 
taken to protect underground facilities, nor is it applicable to an excavation 
made in agricultural operations or for the purpose of finding or extracting 
natural resources or to an excavation made with hand tools on property owned 
or occupied by the person performing the excavation. 
(4) The remedies in this section are in addition to the right of an injured 
public utility or cable operator to recover damages. 
54-8a-9. Association for mutual receipt of notification of 
excavation activities. 
(1) Two or more public utilities or cable operators may form and operate an 
association providing for mutual receipt of notification of excavation activities 
in a specified area. In areas where an association is formed, notification to the 
association is affected [effected] as set forth in § 54-8a-4. In areas where aa 
association is formed, public utilities and cable operators with underground 
facilities in the area shall become members of the association or participate in 
and receive the services furnished by it„ A public utility owned by a pubhc 
agency or municipality shall participate in and receive the service furnished 
by the association and pay its share of the cost for the service furnished. The 
association whose members or participants have underground facilities within 
a county shall file a description of the geographical area served by the associa-
tion and list the name and address of every member and participating public 
utility or cable operator with the county clerk and the county recorder. 
(2) If notification is made by telephone, an adequate record shall be main-
tained by the association to document compliance with the requirements of 
this chapter. 
54-8a-10. Installation of fiberoptic cables. 
Any public utility utilizing a fiberoptic cable shall install the fiberoptic 
cable in a concrete multiduct conduit system or so that it can be located with 
standard metal detection devices. 
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Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability: "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his 
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; 
or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death 
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has 
been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of 
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing 
of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness 
from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the,declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hear-
ing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action 
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or crimi-
nal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing 
that his death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of 
its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to 
render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to 
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability 
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborat-
ing circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement con-
cerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legiti-
macy, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other 
similar fact of personal or family history, even though the declarant had 
no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a 
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another 
person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or 
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be 
likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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THE DAYTON POWER & LIGHT CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. 
MARION HERSHNER, Defendant-Appellant 
Dayton Power vs. Hershner 
Slip Opinion NO. 1101 March 27, 1981 
COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, GREENE COUNTY, OHIO 
PHILLIPS, J. OPINION 
Defendant-appellant, Marion Hershner, appeals to this 
Court from a judgment of the Xenia Municipal Court in favor of 
plaintiff-appellee, appellee, Dayton Power and Light Company 
(DP&L), in the amount of $467.52. 
On October 2, 1977, appellant's automobile collided 
with a utility pole owned by DP&L. In appellant's supplemental 
answers to DP&L's interrogatories, he indicated that he glanced 
in his rear view mirror, drifted off the road to his right, and 
hit a telephone pole. The company replaced the pole, and filed a 
complaint on May 23, 1978 against appellant seeking to recover 
the costs of repair. 
DP&L filed a motion for summary judgment on the issues 
of negligence and damages on December 11, 1978. The motion was 
supported by an affidavit of Craig S. Zimmerman, assistant 
supervisor in DP&L's plant accounting department. Attached to the 
affidavit and incorporated therein were four pages labeled "Work 
Order Cost Summary." Paragraph nine of the affidavit states "that 
the total expense of $467.52 reasonably and accurately reflects 
the actual cost incurred to the Dayton Power and Light Company in 
repairing the damage to its property." 
In opposition to DP&L's motion for summary judgment, 
appellant filed, 1) a memorandum contra motion for summary 
judgment, and 2) a personal affidavit. A hearing on the summary 
judgment was held before the court on March 15, 1979, with 
appellant thereafter filing a supplemental memorandum contra the 
motion for summary judgment on May 4, 1979. 
The trial court in its decision and entry of June 19, 
1979, stated in pertinent part: 
"The Court is of the opinion, after considering all the 
arguments and the law offered in support on both sides, that the 
better and logical reasoning is in favor of Plaintiff's position. 
Defendant's main argument is that the indirect expenses charged 
by Plaintiff are not directly applicable or proximate to the 
damages incurred to Plaintiff's property. While this is not a 
specious argument, and one that does have some basis in reported 
case law, the Court feels that true compensatory damages must 
include the indirect expenses found in the general and 
administrative catagories as elements of the cost to replace the 
pole, and hence compensible." 
The trial court sustained DP&L motion for summary 
judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff DP&L in the 
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amount of $467.52. 
Appellant asserts as his sole assignment of error: 
"THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SAID 
PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $467.52 IN THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO 
EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER AS TO DAMAGES WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE INTO SAID 
EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE 2317.40 (BUSINESS RECORD 
STATUTE) AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION WHATSOEVER OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION BETWEEN THE TORT OF THE DEFENDANT AND ANY OF 
THE DAMAGES ALLEGED." 
A. Appellant's first argument is that DP&L has not presented 
any evidence as to its damages, as the work order cost summaries 
are not admissible into evidence pursuant to the business records 
statute, R.C. 2317.40. 
Mr. Zimmerman's affidavit, filed with DP&L motion for 
summary judgment, stated in pertinent part: 
"Affiant further on oath says: 
(1) that he is employed by The Dayton Power and Light 
Company as an Assistant Supervisor of the Plant Accounting 
Department. 
(2) That he is the custodian of the attached Work Order 
Cost Summaries (Exhibits B and C). 
(3) that the Work Order Cost Summaries accumulates 
and/or provides a reference for the costs incurred in connection 
with the installation and/or removal of the Company's property. 
Costs for one job are kept separate from those for another job by 
the assignment of a unique work order number to each individual 
job. In the case of a job involving both the installation and 
removal of property, costs for the installation (construction) 
are kept separate from those for the removal (retirement) by the 
assignment of a "retirement code" in addition to the work order 
number. 
(4) that the Work Order Cost Summaries are prepared 
monthly, in the ordinary course of business, pursuant to sound 
accounting principles, and are based on the experience of the 
Company over a long period of time. 
(5) that the attached Work Order Costs Summaries 
(Exhibits B and C) are a record of the costs incurred by The 
Dayton Power and Light Company as a result of property damage 
which occurred on October 2, 1977 in Xenia, Ohio on U.S. 35 in 
the vicinity of Orange Street and Allison Avenue, which is the 
subject of Case No. 78-CV-263 in the Xenia Municipal Court. 
(6) that the information contained in the attached work 
Order Cost Summaries was compiled at or near the time of 
occurrence stated in paragraph 5 above. 
(7) that the costs referred to in paragraph 5 above, 
were accumulated on work order number 11847. Costs for the 
removal of the damaged property are listed on one cost summary 
marked Exhibit B, and costs for the installation of the new 
property are listed on another costs summary marked Exhibit C. 
(8) that the total amount of costs actually incurred by 
The Dayton Power and Light Company for work order number 11847 
was $467.52. 
(9) that the total expense of $467.52 reasonably and 
accurately reflects the actual costs incurred to The Dayton 
Power and Light Company in repairing the damage to its property." 
The work order cost summaries are computer printouts 
which list: 1) the date the information is entered, 2) a 
description of the entry, 3) work order number, 4) a retirement 
code if any, 5) a voucher or symbol number, and 6) the cost. All 
entries are dated 10/77, with the summaries having the date 
March, 1978, in the upper right hand corner of each sheet. 
R.C. 2317.40 states: "As used in this section 
'business' includes every kind of business, profession, 
occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether 
carried on for profit or not. A record of an act, condition, or 
event, in so far as relevant, is competent evidence if the 
custodian or the person who made such record or under whose 
supervision such record was made testifies to its identity and 
the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular 
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or 
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of 
information, method, and time of preparation were such as to 
justify its admission. This section shall be so interpreted 
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make the 
law of this state uniform with those states which enact similar 
legislation." 
This Court recognizes that in today's business world, 
computers and computerized bookkeeping have become commonplace, 
and that the business records exception to the hearsay rule is 
intended to bring the realities of the business world into a 
court of law. 
In this case, however, DP&L is attempting to prove by 
computer printout its unliquidated damages. This can be 
contrasted to the use of computer printouts to show a liquidated 
amount due, such as on an account. Because of the difference 
between what the two types of computer printouts are intended to 
prove, this Court is not passing on a computer printout's 
introduction into evidence pursuant to R.C. 2317.40 in general. 
Rather, we confine ourselves to computer printouts introduced for 
the purpose of proving unliquidated damages. 
Mr. Zimmerman states in his affidavit that: 1) he is 
custodian of the work order cost summaries, 2) that the summaries 
were prepared in the ordinary course of business, and 3) that the 
summary accurately reflects the cost incurred in the replacement 
of the pole. 
These mere conclusions on the part of the foundation 
witness that the records were made in the ordinary course of 
business are not a sufficient foundation for the printouts' 
introduction into evidence. 
Specific proof must be presented that the computer 
records were made in the ordinary course of business. This would 
include testimony that the printouts were routinely made rather 
than specifically prepared for trial, and that they were relied 
on by DP&L as sufficiently accurate for business purposes. 
Further, the foundation witness must describe in detail 
any calculations or abbreviations appearing in the printout. 
Abbreviations in DP&L's work cost summaries are not explained. 
In addition, the original source of the information contained in 
the printout must be shown, and the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the information must be established. These 
requirements were not met by DP&L in its effort to prove 
unliquidated damages by the work cost summaries. 
However, we find no merit in appellant's contention 
that the record needs to be printed near the time of the act. 
The entry of the material is the critical issue, not when the 
printout of the information occurs. 
Our research and that of counsel has not disclosed any 
decisions in Ohio concerning computer printouts. However, see 
generally 11 ALR 3d 1377; Monarch Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. v. 
Genser (1977), 156 N.J. Supr. 107, 383 A.2d 475. 
Mr. Zimmerman did not lay the proper foundation for the 
introduction of the work cost summaries into evidence. His mere 
conclusions as to the printouts, without compliance with the 
above enumerated requirements, do not bring this material into 
evidence pursuant to Ohio's business records exception. 
Summary judgment should not, therefore, have been granted to DP&L 
as to the amount of damages, as the moving party did not present 
evidence showing it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
B. Appellant further asserts that accounting procedures cannot 
establish principles of tort liability.Appellant maintains that 
there must be a demonstration by DP&L of a proximate relationship 
between the company's alleged damages and the tort of appellant. 
In appellant's view, there was no firsthand testimony or 
affidavits of any witness regarding proximate causation, and 
therefore DP&L has relied solely upon accounting niceties and 
computer-generated summaries to provide this vital link in the 
tort-proximate causation-damage claim of proof required in all 
negligence cases. 
This Court stated in The Dayton Power and Light Co. v. 
Puterbaugh (Miami County 1980), unreported, No. 79 CA 13: 
"Our decision of the within matter is limited to the facts in 
this particular case and does not mean that a public utility may 
never recover its indirect overhead expenses as an element of 
damages for the negligent destruction of its utility pole. We 
do not feel, however, that it places an onerous burden upon such 
utilities to come forth with evidence to show that such indirect 
expenses would not have been paid but for the negligence of the 
defendant. All that is required is that the utility prove that 
the damages it seeks to recover naturally and proximately flow 
from the wrong complained of." 
A public utility may recover direct expenses as damages 
for the negligent destruction of its utility pole. But in order 
for the public utility to recover indirect overhead expenses, it 
must come forth with evidence proving that the indirect expenses 
would not have been paid but for the negligence of defendant. 
As the trial court erred in 1) allowing plaintiff DP&L's work 
order cost summaries into evidence as proof of unliquidated 
damages, and 2) permitting DP&L to recover indirect expenses 
without proper proof being submitted into evidence, appellant's 
assignment of error is sustained.. 
As there is nothing in defendant's affidavit, memoranda 
or brief which contests his liability, that part of the judgment 
of the trial court is hereby affirmed. The trial court's 
judgment in favor of plaintiff DP&L in the amount of $467.52 is 
hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for computation of 
damages consistent with the findings of this Court. 
McBRIDE, P. J., and KERNS, J., concur. 
CURTIS E. McINTYRE and JOHN B. WYATT, III, Attorneys at Law, 
Courthouse Plaza Southwest, P.O. Box 1247, Dayton, Ohio 45401, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
ARTHUR A. AMES, Attorney at Law, 1300 Talbott Tower, Dayton, Ohio 
45402, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
THE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. JEFFREY BROCK, Defendant-Appellant. 
CG & E Co. vs. Brock 
Slip Opinion 
APPEAL NO. C-830137, TRIAL NO. 81 CV 36721 
December 21, 1983 
COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO, HAMILTON 
COUNTY, OHIO 
STATEMENT: Civil Appeal from Hamilton County Municipal Court 
KLUSMEIER, J. OPINION. On November 11, 1979, 
defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Brock drove his car into a utility 
pole owned by plaintiff-appellee, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. 
Suit was filed against the defendant in the amount of $835.46 for 
damages caused by defendant's negligence. The damages sought by 
the plaintiff represented its alleged cost to repair the pole 
and restore utility service. 
Prior to trial, the defendant stipulated that his 
negligence directly and proximately caused damage to the 
plaintiff's utility pole and transformer. The cause thus 
proceeded to trial only on the question of the extent of damages. 
At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of nine witnesses 
along with nineteen exhibits. The defendant called no witnesses, 
but did offer into evidence three documents obtained from the 
plaintiff's records. The crucial testimony at trial related to 
the work required to repair the transformer and replace the pole 
and to the accounting system used to compute the cost of those 
repairs. At the close of the evidence, the court found that the 
plaintiff had not proved that the transformer was damaged as a 
result of the defendant's negligence. The court, however, did 
find that the plaintiff had proved that the damage to the pole 
was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence and that the 
amount of damage had also been proved. Judgment was rendered for 
the plaintiff in the sum of $750.24 plus costs. The defendant 
timely perfected the instant appeal. 
The defendant, in his sole assignment of error, 
contends that the court erred in granting judgment on the issue 
of damages because the plaintiff failed to prove that the damage 
had been directly and proximately caused by his negligent act. 
We agree in part. 
Several courts in this state as well as other states have 
considered the issue of damages with respect to the injury or 
destruction of a power or telephone pole. See Cincinnati Bell, 
Inc. v. Hinterlong (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1981), 70 Ohio Misc. 38, 
437 N.E.2d 11 and cases cited therein. In this regard, the 
courts have consistently held that compensatory damages are 
intended to make the plaintiff whole for the wrong done to him by 
the defendant. From this flow two well-known corollaries — the 
plaintiff is not to be placed in a better position then he would 
have been in had the wrong not been done, and, damages are 
limited to those injuries flowing directly from, and as the 
proximate and natural result of, the defendant's wrong. 
Neither party contends that this is not the law or that 
the law should in any way be altered. Instead, the parties' 
contention centers around the application of these general 
principles to a case such as this in which the cost of repair 
reflects the measure of damage and the repairs are actually made 
by the plaintiff rather than some independent third party. In 
the latter case, the cost of repair and, accordingly, the amount 
necessary to make the plaintiff whole, generally would be the 
amount paid by the plaintiff to the third party that repaired the 
damages. Where, however, the plaintiff maintains, as part of its 
overall operation, a division specifically for the purpose of 
repairing injuries to itself regardless of how the injury occurs, 
application of above mentioned rules of damages becomes more 
difficult. The difficulty comes in trying to determine whether 
certain portions of overhead are properly attributable to the 
injury caused by a particular defendant. Application of the 
above rules is further complicated by the fact that the 
plaintiff, as a public utility, computes direct costs, such as 
the cost of the labor expended in repairing the damaged pole, on 
the basis of an accounting system mandated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission and the Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio as part of their rate supervision responsibilities. 
Using that accounting system, the plaintiff computes 
the cost of repair with respect to pole damage cases by taking 
the sum of the costs of the various aspects of the repair which 
have been allocated to three categories or accounts: material 
costs, vehicle hours on the job, and man hours worked. A fixed 
percentage of the costs incurred with respect to each of these 
accounts is then added to cover "jobbing overhead" and an 
additional, similarly calculated amount, is added to the cost of 
materials to cover "stores expense." 
The controversy on appeal focuses on the methods used 
to calculate labor costs and jobbing overhead. These two matters 
will be analyzed separately, but it is also necessary that we 
examine and rule on the other components of the court's lump sum 
award since the entire award is the subject of the assignment of 
error. Testimony at trial was offered to support the various 
charges itemized in the defendant's bill. Reference to the bill 
shows that the defendant was charged for the cost of the 
materials used to make the necessary repairs. This cost was then 
increased by the previously mentioned stores expense in order to 
cover the cost of disbursing the materials from the plaintiff's 
storage facility. An additional charge was made for the cost to 
the plaintiff of maintaining and using the vehicles involved in 
making the repairs. Upon a careful review of the record with 
respect to these particular costs we concur in the trial court's 
determination that they were proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligence. The same, however, cannot be said with 
respect to the labor costs and the jobbing overhead. 
With respect to labor, the cost charged to the 
defendant was the product of the total, direct labor hours 
expended by the individual employees within each of the several 
classifications of employees assigned to replace the pole times 
an average wage rate for each employee classification„ While 
this may be sound accounting practice, it is not acceptable with 
respect to the law of damages. The plaintiff's accounting 
supervisor testified that the company's records would reflect 
which employees worked on this particular repair, the total wages 
paid to each employee during the year and the number of 
on-the-job hours per employee. With this information, the 
plaintiff could determine its actual cost per on-the-job hour 
for each employee. That amount could then be multiplied by the 
number of hours worked by that particular employee to arrive at 
the actual cost to the plaintiff of having that employee repair 
the damage caused by a particular defendant. The method 
currently being used to calculate labor costs gives an average 
cost for an employee within a certain classification rather than 
the actual cost of the particular employee who made the repair. 
The law of damages provides that only those damages proximately 
or directly caused by the defendant's negligence are 
compensable. Thus, as to this one aspect of the judgment, the 
damage caused by the defendant can be and should have been 
directly traced to the cost of a particular employee's labor, 
rather than the cost of some mythical "average1" employee. The 
plaintiff failed to prove that all the elements of damage 
presented to the court were proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
Application of the law of damages to jobbing overhead 
does not lend itself to easy resolution. Our research discloses 
that only four cases on this issue have reached the appellate 
courts of Ohio. Dayton Power and Light Co. v. Hershner, No. 1101 
(2d Dist. Mar. 27, 1981); Dayton Power and Light Co. v. 
Puterbaugh, No. 79 CA 13 (2d Dist. Mar* 7, 1980) ; Ohio Power Co. 
v. Zemelka (7th Dist. 1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 213, 251 N.E.2d 2; 
Warren Telephone Co. v. Hakala (11th Dist. 1957), 105 Ohio App. 
459, 152 N.E.2d 718. The plaintiff in the case sub judice 
argues that the Hakala case, supra, stands for the proposition 
that indirect overhead costs can be recovered whenever such 
costs have been correctly calculated in accordance with sound 
accounting principles and that the Zemelka court, in dicta, 
expressly approved such a rule. We, however, do not read these 
decisions, or any of those cited above, as adopting a per se rule 
with respect to the exclusion or inclusion of overhead as an item 
of damage for two reasons. 
First, a rule of law does not exist in the abstract. 
Therefore, any application of that rule to the facts of another 
case must be made in light of the factual setting that gcive rise 
to the rule. To this end, we take note of the fact that the 
court in Hakala, before holding that indirect costs were 
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recoverable, was careful to point out that there was not only 
sufficient evidence to prove that the cost of repairs included 
direct and indirect costs, but no evidence to refute this proof. 
We are quite confident, however, that had there been no proof 
that indirect costs had been incurred as a result of the damage, 
the Hakala court would not have permitted their recovery 
regardless of how those costs had been computed.Thus, the primary 
question was and the question before this court is that of 
proximate cause, i.e., what indirect or overhead costs, if 
any, have been incurred because of the defendant's negligence. 
The method of calculation is crucial with respect to the amount 
of damage suffered, i.e., are the damages merely conjectural 
or have they been proved with reasonable certainty. It is only 
after proximate causation has been determined in resolution of 
the primary question that the method of calculation of the amount 
of damages has any pertinency. Thus, the plaintiff's reliance 
on its accounting system and the fact that it is imposed upon it 
by law is misplaced. 
Second, the law of damages is just what its name 
implies — a legal concept, not an accounting concept. The two 
disciplines are not synonymous and their distinct purposes must 
not be confused. With respect to an operation such as that of 
the plaintiff or a manufacturer, the purpose of the accountant, 
as stated by plaintiff's accounting supervisor, is to take all 
the costs of operating a business and distribute them in a fair 
and equitable manner to each job done by the business. In 
furtherance of this purpose, the accountant took all the overhead 
(indirect) costs and allocated them to each job in such a way 
that no one job bore any greater proportion of the cost than any 
other job bore to the total direct costs of all jobs. While the 
law is concerned that all the "costs" of all torts committed 
against a plaintiff are recovered, the law is not concerned with 
whether each tortfeasor bears an equal portion of the total 
overhead in relation to the direct costs. To the contrary, the 
purpose of the law is to require the tortfeasor to pay only those 
costs incurred because of his actions. Accordingly, the law 
requires the tortfeasor to pay for those overhead costs which, 
with reasonable diligence by the victim, can be directly 
attributed with reasonable certainty to the tortfeasor. 
We realize that in some instances it may be difficult 
if not impossible to determine to what extent tortious conduct 
may have increased costs over and above the cost of every day 
operations. This difficulty is well demonstrated in the case at 
bar. The plaintiff would have incurred some costs related to 
pole repairs just because of the nature of its business. For 
example, the plaintiff would have had to employ a certain number 
of persons and maintain a certain number of vehicles and tools 
just to replace wornout poles and poles damaged by acts of 
nature. These costs, however, are increased when the plaintiff 
has to buy and maintain additional service vehicles or employ 
additional help in order to meet the increased demand for pole 
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repairs caused by the tortious conduct. Where increased costs 
such as these cannot, with reasonable diligence and certainty, be 
calculated with respect to each tortfeasor, it is fitting, as 
between an innocent party and a wrongdoer, that the wrongdoer be 
responsible for a fixed percentage of those costs calculated then 
in accordance with sound accounting principles. This will most 
often be true with respect to fixed overhead cost such as rent 
and property taxes which remain constant over a period of 
time.Other costs can be more accurately traced to a particular 
defendant with reasonable diligence and in a cost effective 
manner. Most often these costs will be variable overhead costs. 
At the same timef we recognize that not all variable overhead 
costs can be directly traced to a particular defendant. This 
would be true, for example, of supply and utility costs.Such 
costs may then be charged to the defendant in the same manner as 
were fixed overhead costs. In this way the legal concepts as 
opposed to the accounting concepts dictate the recovery that is 
to be had. 
We must now apply these principles to the issue raised 
in the case at bar — proximate cause. The defendant in this 
case, unlike his counterpart in Hakala, brought out on 
cross-examination the fact that several of the items of cost 
attributed to the defendant's negligence were in reality 
attributable to the accounting system used by the plaintiff. The 
matter was summarized in the following exchange between the 
plaintiff's accounting supervisor and defendant's counsel: 
Q. When you say fairly and equitably, aren't you 
really saying that where Mr. Brock's [job] may have be*m less 
expensive, somebody else's job may have been more expensive, but 
we are averaging them out so that they are fair and equitable to 
all? 
A. That's correct. 
T.p. Vol. II, 48. 
This testimony in conjunction with more detailed 
testimony concerning the various components of the overhead cost 
reflects that the defendant was charged with a portion of 
certain costs that were directly incurred because of other 
accidents but not directly incurred because of the defendant's 
accident. Such charges are not in conformity with the rule 
previously stated that one is liable only for those damages that 
directly flow from the injury sustained. This inequity is 
demonstrated by the fact that the defendant was charged with a 
percentage of the costs incurred by the plaintiff as a result of 
overall employee participation in a thrift plan when there was no 
evidence to show to what extent, if any, the employees working on 
this repair participated in that plan. While, as a matter of 
accounting, a portion of the total cost of the plan may be 
allocated to each employee, no part of that cost should be 
charged to the defendant, as a matter of law, if none of the 
employees on this job contributed to that cost. It is our 
conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that all the 
items comprising the jobbing overhead were proximately caused by 
the defendant's negligence. 
The thrust of our decision today is not that overhead 
costs are never recoverable. It is our purpose to point out that 
some overhead costs are not attributable to a particular 
defendant and cannot be charged to him.The question in each case 
to be decided by the trier of fact is: what is the amount of 
indirect costs (overhead) which has been proved with reasonable 
certainty to have been directly and proximately caused by 
defendant's negligence? Where the actual costs of repair, 
including overhead, can be traced directly to a particular 
defendant, the law should encourage their revelation rather than 
accept an average or close approximation. In this way plaintiff 
is more perfectly made whole. 
In accordance with our decision as it relates to the 
charges for labor and jobbing overhead, the judgment of the trial 
court with respect to damages is reversed and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with 
this decision. 
Judgment appealed from is: Reversed and remanded 
PALMER, P.J., and BLACK, J., CONCUR. 
FOOTNOTES: PLEASE NOTE: The Court has placed of record its 
own entry in this case on the date of the release of this 
Opinion. Messrs. Rich, Pott, Wetherell, Foster & Miller, 
Thomas C. Foster, of counsel, 1115 Second National Building, 830 
Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, and The Cincinnati Gas & 
Electric Company, Legal Department, James R. Mack, of counsel, 
P.O. Box 960, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
Messrs. Dooley and Heath, James V. Heath, of counsel, 5827 Happy 
Hollow, Milford, Ohio 45150, for Defendant-Appellant. 
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PHILLIPS, J . 
This appeal'comes before the Court ori the solte question of 
whether a public utility in a negligence action"txa^ f recover, a^ a 
matter of law, indirect overhead costs as an element of damages 
for injury to one of its utility poles,> The court, below held that 
it could so recover. Based upon the record before us, we disagree* 
On October 18, 1977, Appellant's automobile, collided with a 
utility pole owned' by Appellee- As na result of the accident, 
electric service to Appellee's customers in the ^ genertal area sur-
rounding the accident was disrupted. Appellee promptly dispatched 
a crew to repair the damage and rs*&to£e service to its customers. 
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I] Subsequently, Appellee filed suit against Appellant for direct and 
indirect overhead costs of the repairs. 
On August 31* 1978, Appellee filed a motion for summary judg-
ement . Appellant responded to said motion and after the filing of 
supplemental memoranda by both parties, the trial court on November 
30/ 1978, granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of liability but denied same with jcespect to damages. There-J 
after, the parties entered into stipulations which effectively 
narrowed the question to whether or not Appellee could recover its 
indirect costs for the repairs * 
On February 12, 1975, the trial court filed its decision and 
journal entry finding that Appellee could recover its indirect 
[overhead costs. From this decision, Appellant has perfected an 
appeal to this Court. 
Appellant's sole assignment of error states: 
I THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT OVERHEAD 
EXPENSES AND GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, 
THAT IS, ALL INDIRECT COSTS, WERE CHARGEABLE 
AS ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE IN A TORT CASE INVOLVING I 
THE DESTRUCTION OF APPELLEE'S UTILITY POLE. 
I Numerous lower, court opinions have been cited bv both parties* Witt 
I respect to Ohio cases, the majority of. opinions consist of munici-
pal and county court decisions. The decisions are conflicting 
with no apparent way to reconcile some of thern^ In addition to 
Ohio cases, the parties have cited cases from various jurisdictions 
However, in view of the fact that the Ojhto Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed itself to the pending question, we do not feel con-
strained by any of the decisions cited by the parties. We do note 
such cases, however, for whatever guidance they may provide, 
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The measure of damages for the negligent destruction of a 
utility pole is the total replacement cost of thetpole and the 
facilities attached thereto, less accrued depreciation of the 
damaged pole and attached facilities * 52 0* Jur. 2d, Telegraphs 
& Telephones, Section 45; Ohio Power to, v. Huff, 12 Ohio Misc. 214 
(Canton Municipal Court 1967); Ohio Power to. V. Zemelka, 19 Ohio 
App. 2d 213 (Belmont Co. 1969). There is/n6 disagreement between 
the parties that Appellee's direct costs, that is, labor and 
material charges, may be recovered for negligent destruction of 
its utility pole. The sole question before us is whether Appellee 
may recover its indirect costs, that is, overhead expenses such 
as direct payroll overhead, small tool expense, supervision and 
engineering, transportation, store room handling expenses and 
general & administrative expenses. 
Based upon the fundamental rulers of damages that the injured 
party shall have compensation for the injury sustained and that 
compensatory damages are intended to make whole the plaintiff for 
the wrong done to him,,16 0. Jur. 2d, Damacjesc Section 9, the 
lower court found that Appellee was entitled to recover its in-
direct costs for the repairs, The court's decision and entry 
stated: 
As indicated by the plaintiff*s'exhibits and as 
stipulated by,the defendant, the plaintiff in its 
accounting system applys a fixed percentage rate 
to its direct and material costs to arrive at 
an indirect cost factor.^ The factor consists of, 
but not limited 'to, payroll overhead, small tools 
expense, supervision in engineering, transporta-
tion, administrative and general expense and 
storeroom handling charges. Singling out adminis-
trative andvgeneral^expense, hereinafter referred 
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to as &>& A, we can assume this includes as^ 
example; all non-direct labor personnel costs, 
telephone costs and even the president's salary. 
It is accepted that all of these costs are on-
!
 going and continuing costs of doing business by | any business enterprise* 
In defining.overheadlexpenses the.court stated: 
Overhead is a broad category that.is a-cost of 
doing business which can notobe divorced from 
the cost of the product furnished or of the cost 
of operating the business enterprise.** For ex-
ample
 f Social Security taxes, unemployment taxes, 
fringe benefits in the form of pension plans, 
vacation sick pay and other"contractual obliga-
tions of.th6"corporation to its employees, and 
I other types :of continuing business expenses 
J directly associated with the operation of the 
j business. It must be pointed out that this 
overhead expense continues just as direct labor 
I continues while the worker is in the employment 
I of the corporation. 
Further: 
J The third Sategory, G &-A 4GeneraL_Administrative 
J as defined above) ~ is^ an iteirTwhich again is common 
-to all businesses and which is an expense which 
must be born in either the end price charged for 
the. firm1s products or recovered from any other 
j source of income to the business• 
Fundamentally then, if a business is to remain in 
operation, it-must provide for not only the salaries 
or payment of its direct labor employees-and the 
I material-on^which theycwork but-have the overhead 
I and administration of these employees m order to 
be able to. market its,product and remain competitive 
within its industry. 
If plaintiff, Dayton Power & Light Co., had con-
tracted to have the work done by an outside agency, 
the cost.would be readily estimable e.g-, the 
I contract cost. There is no question that the con-
tract cost would contain for the^benefit of the 
contractor overhead, direct labor cost, G & A and 
a margin for-profit. 
The trial court concluded: 
Not to reimburse the company-for'the attendant over-
} head and G & A that is associated with^that direct 
-4-
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labor would be to not make the plaintiff whole 
but to permit him to recover less than that to 
which he'was actually damaged. 
Since plaintiff in this case has adopted a system i 
of accounting which is uniform and capable,, of 
isolation with cost on each jspecif ic item., the 
court would find that in reviewing all -of the j 
applicable cases cited by the parties that pver- [ 
head expenses and general tand 'administrative I 
expenses are propetly chargeable as elements of ! 
damage; and that the plaintiff- has established ' 
to the degree of certainty necessary that the 
direct and indirect expenses involved m the I 
replacement of the utility poles; and accord-
ingly, plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the ' 
amount of $450.74 with interest from the date 
of this judgment as (sic) the rate of six per- j 
cent (€%) . I 
It appears that the current greater weight of Ohio authority 
on this question does allow recovery of such indirect $ ..overhead 
costs. See: Warren ^ Telephone Co. v. Hakala,'lOSjDhio App. 459 
(Trumbull County 1957); Ohio Power Co* v. Johnstony 18 Ohio Misc. 
55 (Hancock County Common Pleas 1968) ; Ohio Power Co. v. Zemelka 
19 Ohio App. 2d 213 (Belmont County 1969). However, it is also 
a fundamental rule that the damages recoverable: 
(1) are limited to those injuries or losses 
which""are-the natural/ proximate, and probable 
consequences of the wrong complained of, (2) 
must naturally and proximately flow from the 
original wrongful act, and (3) must be shown 
with-certainty and' not left' to> speculation or 
conjecture. 16 O. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sections 
13-15. 
Appellee, in its brief, recognizes and does not contest that 
the -above statement is a fundamental precept in the law of damages. 
Based upon thi£ limitation on damages* we quote with, ^ approval the 
following language^ 
Damages -must be -proximate and .cannot be remote or 
speculative. There is no logical or legal connection 
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between the breaking of a wooden power pole by 
t&e defendant and salaries <*£ c^xks in oiiic^s , \ 
superintendents of construction, distribution 
superintendents, safety coordinators, general 
office accounting personnelt supervisors of trans-
mission and distribution, supervisors jDf labor 
relations, etc. The salaries uf these persons 
whose salaries are fixed, did not flow from, 
nor were they affected by £he negligence of the 
defendant. These salaries and .expenses vould 
have been paid if the defendant had not broken 
the pole and damaged the connected facilities. 
Such operating expenses mi#kt be proper in fix-
ing a rate schedule, but w£ do not feel that 
they have anything to do w*tk damages to a power 
pole. 
If we try to compute by a percentage, as claimed 
by the accountant of the plaintiff, the percentage 
would be the same if one, fifty, or no poles were 
destroyed, and would not b£ affected by the number I 
of items charged to the inventory. Fixed income ] 
employees and store expenses are remote matters 
from the accident which the defendant had. 
Ohio Power Co. v. Huff, 12 Ohio Misc. at 222. 
In the instant: case, Appellee presented jio evidence whatsoever 
that these so-called indirect overhead^expenses would not have 
been paid, notwithstanding the negligent .actions of Appellant. No 
evidence was presented to show, for example, that due to Appellantfi 
negligence, fcxtra employees had to be called in to work, thereby 
necessitating extra payroll taxes, insurance, etc. In the absence 
of evidence that Appellee1s indirect costs were incurred as a 
result of Appellant's negligence, Appellee has failed to demonstrate 
that the damages it seeks to recover flow directly from and as a 
natural, probable and proximate result of the wrong complained of. 
Based upon tne record before this Court, we are in full accord with 
the statement of Justice-Reynolds in Central Illinois Light Co. v. 
Stenzel, 44 111. App. 2d 388 (1963)- We quote: 
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The supervision costs, unless directly con-
nected with the repair of the pole and line, 
the store expenses, and the general overhead, 
are such expenses that would have been Incurred 
and paid, without regard to the breaking of 
the pole. They constitute part of the opera-
ting expenses >of the plaintiff and this court 
can see no relation of these costs to the 
negligence of the defendant. In so holding, 
this court is cognizant of the complex costs 
Of operation of a business such as that of 
the plaintiff, but at the same time, this 
court cannot see any thread of continuity, 
any relation, whatsoever, between the cost 
of operation of the plaintiff, and the damages 
occasioned by the defendant breaking the pole 
of the plaintiff* We think the rule of damages 
which requires that the damages must be those 
that flow as the natural consequence of the 
negligence of the defendant must not be ig-
nored. In doing so we are not ignoring the 
facts of business life, but following the law 
of damages•... 
44 111. App. 2d at 397-98. 
Our decision of the within matter is limited to the facts in j 
this particular case and does not mean that a public*utility,may 
never recover its indirect overhead expenses as an element of 
damages for the negligent destruction of it£ utility pole. We 
do not feel, however, that it places an onerous burden upon such 
utilities to come forth with evidence to show that such indirect 
expenses would-not have been paid but for the negligence of the { 
defendant. All that is required is that the utility prove that the 
damages it seeks to recover naturally and proximately flow from 
the wrong complained of. j 
Appellant's assignment of error is well taken. 
Having found prejudicial error in the record of these pro-
ceedings, the decision of the Miami County Municipal Court will 
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be reversed and the case remanded for recomputation of the damage 
award in a manner consistent with the findings of this Court. 
McBRIDE, P.JW and KERNS/ J., concur. 
FINAL ENTRY 
The decision of the Jiiami County '.Municipal Court is hereby 
reversed and the case remanded for 'further ^ proceedings in accord-
ance with this opinion. 
/ \PRESIDING JUDGE 
Copies mailed to: 
Curtis E. Mclntyre 
Arthur A. Ames 
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SECTION 5 NON-EXEMPT MATERIAL • LIST PROPER NOMENCLATURE 
DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL ACCOUNT COOE QUANTITY \ 
SECTION 6 MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 
| SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT HOURS SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT HOURS i 
SECTION 7 SUBCONTRACTORS BILLS 




NOTES: Include names, addresses and telephone numbers of witnesses and police report, etc 
SECTION 8 Employee signing report may be required to testify regarding the facts stated on m>e~n?rm 
— / V/y Torn SUPERVISOR • PRINT 
'LL 
ATTACH ORIGINAL TROUBLE TICKET AND 3888 TO THIS FORM y~r 
